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I. INTRODUCTION

Water development in the western U.S.
has produced a number of large surface

storage and diversion facilities. These
surface supply projects have often
resulted in significant degradation of
aquatic and terrestrial environments due
to water diversion and habitat inundation.
In addition, the agricultural and urban
water supplies which these projects
produced have frequently generated
pollution discharges and further
environmental degradation.
Western water development has
generally been governed neither by
economic efficiency criteria in project
planning nor by a system of economic price
signals for water users. This lack of
economic planning and allocation criteria
has been due to various market failures
and to institutional, legal, and political
rigidities. Reforms in the water
allocation and investment planning
processes could alleviate both the
economic inefficiencies and environmental
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costs associated with the existing water
allocation and development system. The
"least cost" criterion for planning water
supply and pollution control facilities,
along with voluntary water markets, has
the potential to produce economic and
environmental benefits within many western
water systems.
References:
(1) White, C.F., Strategies of American
Water Management, University of Michigan
Press, 1970
(2) Kelso, N.M., W.E. Martin, and L.E.
Mack, Water Supplies and Economic Growth
in an Arid Environment, The University of
Arizona Press, 1973
(3) Engelbert, E.A., and A.F. Scheuring
(eds), Competition for California Water.
Alternative Resolutions, University of
California Press, 1982
(4) Frederick, Kenneth D., and J.C. Hanson
(eds),
Resources for the Future, 1982
(5) Anderson, T.L. (ed), Water Rights,
Ballinger, 1983

(6) Weatherford, G.D., and F.L. Brown
(eds), New courses for the Colorado River
The University of New Mexico Press, 1986

II. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY CRITERIA
A. Markets
An economic allocation is said
to be efficient, or "Pareto optimum", if
no individual can be made better off
without another individual being made
worse off. In practical policy settings,
an alternative formulation of the economic
efficiency criterion involves "Pareto
dominant" reallocations which make at
least some individuals or interests better
off without making others worse off, or
which make some interests better off while
adequately compensating other interests
for their losses (Hicks-Kaldor
optimality). The Pareto criterion says
nothing, however, about the equity of the
underlying distribution of wealth, and its
attainment depends upon the existence of
several conditions on the demand and
supply sides of markets. Nevertheless,
the competitive equilibrium paradigm is

useful in understanding the importance of
"least cost" approaches.
D. Demand
The consumer demand function
indicates that the quantity of water
demanded depends upon the price of water,
the prices of substitutes, and income
levels. Where water is a "derived demand"
as an production input (e.g. irrigation),
demand depends upon the price of water,
the price of input substitutes, and the
price of outputs (e.g. crops). If the
price of water increases, the quantity of
water demanded decreases -- empirical
studies show a negative price "elasticity
of demand" in both the urban and
agricultural sectors. The "substitution
effect" component of the effect of price
increases on quantity demanded results
from the decreasing relative price of
water substitutes relative to the price of
water, i.e., capital equipment (in the
long-run) or labor (in the short- and
long-run) are be used more intensively and
water is used less. Water demand
increments for consumption and production

-4

purposes are economically efficient up to

the point at which the value of the
marginal unit of water used is equal to
the price of water. There are many users
of water on the demand side -- households,
businesses, and agriculture -- so that the
potential for competitive conditions
exists in terms of numbers of individuals
in the market.
C. Supply
The supply curve or function
represents the cost minimizing set of
combinations of inputs for each level of
supply. Prices of inputs used in
producing water, such as labor,
construction materials, energy, and
finance, underlie these cost minimizing
sets. Different cost functions exist for
different water supply technologies, i.e.
facilities for surface dam and diversion ;
wastewater reclamation; and groundwater
use. Cost functions for water
conservation facilities and practices
exist as well. The long-run marginal cost
function intersects the long-run average
cost function at its minimum. The
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long-run average cost function is the
"envelope" of the family of short-run
average cost functions. The
profit-maximizing level of water supply is
that at which the price of water equals
the marginal cost of supply.
D. Competitive Equilibrium and
"Second Best"
Three sets of conditions on the
demand and supply sides are necessary for
competitive equilibrium. (1) The marginal
rates of substitution between water and
its substitutes are equal to the ratio of
the price of the substitute to the price
of water for all consumers. (2) The value
of the marginal product of water produced
by each input equals the input's price,
which equals the value of the marginal
product of other goods produced by that
input. This condition holds for all
inputs. (3) The ratio of the price of
water to that of other products equals the
ratio of the marginal product of that
other product from any input to the
marginal product of water from that same
input, i.e. the so-called marginal rate

of transformation between two products
equals the marginal rate of substitution
between those two products for all
producers and consumers. Several
preconditions exist along with these
marginal decisionmaking criteria,
including the presence of large numbers of
individuals and access to high quality
information on both sides of the markets.
These conditions must apply not
only within the water market, but also
within other sectors of the economy with
which water interacts in order to realize
the benefits of economic welfare
maximization. Due to a myriad of
complicated market failures, however, some
of these conditions frequently do not
exist. Failures within the water market,
particularly on the supply side, indicate
a so-called "second best" problem. This
problem is that the design of water
policies to rectify violations of the
optimality conditions may or may not
induce increments in economic welfare.
The concept of "Pareto dominance" becomes
important in attempts to design water
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policies consistent with the optimizing
preconditions which make at least some
individuals or interests better off either
without making others worse off, or
alternatively in adequately compensating
any losses.
References:
(1) Herfindahl, 0.C., and A.V. Kneese,
EcopomicTheory_thlatuLal_Ae.82Prces,
C.E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1974.
(2) Howe, C.E., Natural Resousce
Economics:. Issues. Analys i s. and Policy,
John Wiley and Sons, 1979.
(3) Varian, H.R., Microeconomic Analysis,
W.W. Norton, 1984.

III. Market Failures
A. Decreasing Costs
The technology of supply can be
such that a very large size of operation
relative to the total market is required
in order to lower per unit production
costs. This mayl violate the optimality
conditions because (1) competition on the
supply side is constrained due to the
existence of only one (monopoly)or a few
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(oligopoly) large suppliers, and (2) the
setting of price equal to marginal

cost

requires a deficit by the supplier.
Decreasing cost conditions probably
existed for some of the large water supply
projects constructed by the federal
government as well as by some state and
local water agencies in the western U.S..
Such "economies of scale" associated with
decreasing costs have been a prime reason
for the institutionalization of water
supply monopolies as part of the economic
development of the West.
B. Public Goods
Public goods or collective goods
are enjoyed in common in the sense that
individual use or consumption does not
lead to a dimunition in any other
individual' s consumption of the same good.
Consumptive trade-off s among individuals
are not made for public goods, and the
marginal cost is zero. Features of water
supply projects which have public goods
aspects are flood control and, where
congestion is not a concern, recreation.
The public goods aspect has often formed
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the rationale for public subsidies for
water supply projects, such as the
"non-reimburseable" component of federal
reclamation projects.
C. Externalities
Externalities result when water use
by consuming or producing interests has
negative (or positive) impacts on other
individuals or interests. Negative
externalities from water use result from
diversion of water and from pollution
discharges in that wildlife habitats,
recreational values, drinking water
quality, and various property values are
adversely affected. These types of
externalities involve costs which are not
incorporated into the supply curve so that
market prices do not reflect the resulting
damages. Legislation designed to control
various types and sources of water
pollution aim to internalize these
external costs to a degree by, for
example, setting standards for the
discharge of pollutants. The
subsidization of pollution controls,
however, detracts from this
internalization process.
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References:
(1) Kahn, A.E., The Economics ol
RegulatOn;

Principles and Instituting,

John Wiley and Sons, 1970.
(2) Krutilla, J.V., and A.C. Fisher,

Mg

Economics de_1101A.01-EREiLanmsta, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1975.
(3) Freeman, A.M., III, Air and Water
Pollution Control -- A Bens-fit-got
Assessment, John Wiley and Sons, 1982.

IV. Existing Systems of Water Allocation
A. Pricing
1. Local
Water pricing at the local level
is implemented by independent special
districts, municipally owned waterworks,
mutual water companies, and private
companies. Many hold water rights
generally as riparian landholders or as
appropriaters under state water law. In
California, for example, some 2,500 local
water districts handle nearly
three-fourths of the state's annual water
usage. Generally speaking, these water
suppliers price water to meet their

revenue and cash-flow requirements as the
primary goal, i.e. historic average cost
pricing prevails. meters, a precondition
for use-based pricing, exist in some urban
districts and in very few agricultural
districts. Of the metered users,
declining block rate structures reflecting
an era of decreasing costs of supply
dominate, although rate structure
revisions toward flat rate structures are
occurring. In agriculture, per acre fee
assessments with no relation to actual use
are common (e.g. one-third of California
irrigation water use is distributed in
this way). Even in the urban sector,
taxes and assessments are an important
source of revenue in addition to water
charges (e.g. nearly one-half in
California urban districts).
2. State and Federal
State and even federal water projects
use pricing procedures which vary somewhat
among western states. The state (SWP) and
federal (CVP) projects in California
provide a good illustration, however, of
the methods often applied. New contract
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prices are less than the full marginal
cost of new project supply due to (1) use
of taxpayer revenues to subsidize project
development and operation, (2) application
of historical average costs to the
calculation of repayments in project water
prices, and (3) the absence of price
elasticity as a demand determinant in the
planning of future supply projects.
3. Impact on Least Cost Supply
Development
The use of taxpayer revenues, fee
assessments, and historical average cost
pricing procedures sends water price
signals to users which are far below the
marginal costs of new supply projects. In
some cases, particularly in agriculture,
no water price signal is sent at all.
Given the institutional orientation of
many water supply agencies, particularly
federal and to some extent state, toward
surface dam and diversion projects, these
pricing procedures provide incentives
which are counter to least cost
development among all alternatives. Water
contractors and users have the option of
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reducing their demand for new surface
water supplies by increasing efficiency of
use, by reusing and reclaiming water, and
by groundwater management. The costs of
these alternatives, however, are derived
from today's markets for labor, finance,
and materials, which must then be compared
to the costs of project surface water
derived from the past economic conditions
upon which historical costs are based. In
addition, subsidies for such alternatives,
if extant, are usually much smaller than
those applied to federal and some state
supply projects. The result is that these
pricing procedures discourage development
of lower cost alternatives on the demand
side of the market to surface water supply
projects.
B. Water Investment Planning
1. Rational Economic Planning
Long construction times on many types
of water projects make a planning process
essential. Rational economic planning
requires: (1) systematic projection of
future water demands under stated
assumptions about economic and population
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growth, with the effects on water demand
of changes in relative prices and price
elasticity of demand explicitly taken into
account; and (2) analysis of alternative
water supplies, including surface storage
and diversion, wastewater reclamation,
groundwater management, and other
potential sources. In water systems in
which water markets and marginal cost
pricing of new supplies do not exist,
rational planning also requires that
investments in water use efficiency and
conservation facilities be included as
well, since such demand-reducing measures
cannot be expected to occur as a result of
market price incentives.
2. Actual Project Planning
Water project planning rarely
approximates a rational economic process
due primarily to the water supply
institutions that have arisen as a result
of market failures. In general, economic
planning becomes more relevant to the
supply agencies as the amount of subsidy
decreases and the degree of use- and
cost-based pricing increases. This means
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that local districts and agencies tend to
behave relatively more rationally in this
regard. Even though such local districts
may not apply economic pricing, the tax
base that forms the collateral for project
investment financing coincides to some
degree with the project beneficiaries,
thereby creating a kind of economic
incentive in supply planning at the
district level.
State and federal agencies tend to
plan water projects with little or no
economic criteria. In California, the SWP
planning and operation procedures are
different from those of the federal CV?,
yet neither has developed a rational
economic way of determining supply,
demand, and water prices. The CVP plans
supply projects and sets prices of
resulting water contracts low enough to
clear the market, i.e., supply determines
demand. The SWP generates demand
artificially by committing the state to
contractual entitlements for future water
deliveries and, in some cases, to the
financial backing of the underlying bonded
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debt, and then plans supply projects. In
both cases, an economic price plays no
role in the planned balancing of water
demand and supply, and the least cost
criteria applied to all supply-augmenting
as well as demand-reducing options is not
used to determine which investments should
be pursued.
References:
(1) Eckstein, 0., Water Resource
Development, Harvard University Press,
1958.
(2) Bain,

R.E. Caves, and J.

Margolis, Northern

Qaiii-Millts

Water

I ndu stry , Johns Hopkins University Press,
1966.
(3) Howe, C E Benefit-Cost AnalyiaiLIST
water System Planning, Water Resources
Monograph 2, American Geophysical Union,
1971.
(4) Phelps, C.E., et al, Efficient Water
Use in Cal_iforrja, Rand Corporation,
Santa Monica, 1978.
(5) Smith, R.T.,

Iroglaiscusttgrs_fl

Financing water in the We&I, The Council
of State Planning Agencies, Washington,
D.C., 1984.
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(6) Willey, Z., Economic peygdsment_Aild
EnvironmeTit_ALQuAlity

in CalifsLaksts

Water System, Institute of Governmental

Studies, University of California,
Berkeley, 1985.

V. Reforming Water Project Planning
A. Context
Given the many market failures
related to water resource use, the use of
social cost-benefit analysis has been
proposed for many years as a means to
ensure economic efficiency in water
project investments. This cost-benefit
framework has not been meaningfully
implemented as an integral part of public
water investment decisionmaking for
various institutional and technical
reasons. Given the many measurement
problems involving the damages of
externalities and the public goods aspects
of water resource developments, this
framework's impact has been more
conceptual than applied. As a result,
water resource use and planning must rely
on quantitative evaluation of private
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benefits and cost within the context of
regulatory constraints.
B. Demand/Marketing
Water pricing reforms for local,
state, and federal projects focus on (1)
marginal variable cost pricing for
existing supplies wherein the capital
expenditures have already been committed;
(2) rate structures reflecting the rising
marginal costs of new supplies; and (3)
seasonal pricing to manage developed
supplies according to weather/hydrologic
conditions. These reforms apply not only
to water supply systems but also to sewage
and water pollution control systems.
Water marketing provides the
opportunity to increase the efficiency of
water use within the confines of the
existing developed supply system, and to
provide economic signals as to the value
of water compared to the costs of new
supplies. The particular inefficiency
associated with the appropriative water
rights system can be alleviated by
allowances for voluntary selling or
leasing of water rights. Markets for
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water pollution discharge permits, which
are used to a degree in some European
settings, also have efficiency potentials.
Both tradeable water rights and discharge
permits require regulatory constraints.
C. Least Cost Planning
Least cost supply planning is
required for economic efficiency purposes.
Surface supply storage and diversion,
groundwater management, wastewater
reclamation, and other water supply
measures are the options available to most
water supply agencies in a least cost
analysis. In addition, where economic
pricing and water marketing conditions do
not exist, the least cost analysis would
include various demand-reducing measures
such as urban water conservation devices,
landscaping, irrigation management, and
tailwater reuse which if implemented would
yield the equivalent of new supplies.
Each of these supply-augmenting and
demand-reducing options has a distinct
long-run marginal cost curve associated
with its development in any specific area.
The long-run least cost curve which
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combines all of these options to determine
the sequence of investments is an envelope
of the individual long-run marginal cost
curves for these options.
Least cost water pollution control
planning is similar to that of water
supply planning. The options are
treatment, disposal, discharge, materials
recycle, water reclamation/reuse, and
conservation and source reduction. In
lieu of operating effluent pricing and
tradeable discharge permit systems, the
least cost pollution control plan includes
demand-reducing measures such as source
reduction, water conservation, and
material recycling as well as such supply
projects as treatment plants and discharge
facilities.
D. Examples/Case Studies
1. Least Cost Supply Planning -IID/MWD Water Trade
The economic merits of a
water trade between the IID and the MWD, a
trade now under active consideration, have
been recognized for years. The economic
benefits to both sides can be evaluated,
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and the range of negotiation established.
Water conservation in the Imperial Valley
as part of a least cost supply plan for
the MWD demonstrates how, in lieu of true
water markets, water supply agencies such
as the MWD must include demand-reducing
measures along with supply-augmenting
facilities in determining the least cost
plan.
2. Least Cost Pollution Control
Planning -- Westlands Water
District
The problem of agricultural water
pollution externalities was highlighted by
the visible damage to waterfowl at
Kesterson Reservoir in California's
Central Valley. Agricultural water
pollution in specific, and the non-point
sources in general, represent the major
remaining water pollution problem in the
U.S. It can be expected that water
pollution regulations, such as those
presently facing many California
irrigation districts, will be developed
for many irrigation districts in the West
as the evidence on external damages
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mounts. The Westlands Water District
(WWD), which contains the problem lands

which polluted Kesterson, has a number of
options in both the off-farm, pollution
disposal side, as well as on the on-farm,
drainage -reduction side. Least cost
analysis is appropriate for the WWD in
making pollution control investment
choices. Markets for water supply can
play a constructive role here in enhancing
the economic efficiency of off-farm water
reclamation and of on-farm water
conservation and drainage reduction.
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